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COLUMBIA GULF TRANSMISSION CO. V. BRIDGES: AN 
EXAMPLE OF DIFFERING DEFINITIONS OF SALES UNDER 
LOUISIANA LAW 
Brian Flanagan* 
This case compares the definition of a sale for sales tax 
purposes with sale as defined by the Louisiana Civil Code. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. (Columbia) is a natural gas 
transmission company seeking to recoup sales tax and use tax paid 
under protest to the Louisiana Department of Revenue.1 Columbia 
transports natural gas through a series of pressurized underground 
pipelines. During transportation, the natural gas loses pressure and 
must be recompressed at compression stations along the way.2 
Some of the gas Columbia transfers is diverted to these 
compression stations and used to power the compressors in order 
to maintain the gas pressure in the pipeline. Pursuant to the gas 
tariff (effective rate schedule) that Columbia was operating under, 
Columbia was not charged for the use of this gas.3 
The Louisiana Department of Revenue asserted that the gas 
belonged to Columbia’s customers, and Columbia’s use of the gas 
to power the compressors constituted a sale in the form of a 
barter.4 Therefore, the Department of Revenue asserted the sale 
was subject to Louisiana state sales tax and use tax.  
                                                                                                             
 *  J.D./D.C.L. Candidate (May, 2013) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, 
Louisiana State University. Special Thanks to Prof. Alain Levasseur for his 
research suggestions, proofreading and editing; to Prof. Olivier Moreteau for 
support and editing, and to Ms. Jennifer Lane for proofreading and editing.  
 1. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. Bridges, 08-1006 (La.App Ct. 1st 
Cir. 6/25/09) 28 So. 3d 1032. 
 2. Id. 
 3. The gas tariff is regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC). 
 4. Columbia, 28 So. 3d at 1035. 
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Columbia paid the taxes under protest while asserting there had 
been no sale. Further, Columbia argued that the Louisiana 
Department of Revenue calculated the use tax based on “spot 
[market] prices,” in violation of the definition of “cost price” set 
forth in Louisiana Revised Statute 47:301.5 Columbia argued that 
it did not pay any price for the fuel, in that it was “tendered to 
Columbia Gulf by its shippers without cost,” thus its taxable “cost 
price” should be zero.6 Therefore, Columbia argued it did not owe 
any sales or use tax on the gas. 
II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
The Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment that had 
been granted in favor of Columbia by the trial court. In doing so, 
the court of appeal distinguished a sale as defined by Louisiana 
Civil Code Article 2439 from a sale defined in the LA. REV. STAT. 
47:301 for sales tax purposes.7 Using the definition in LA. REV. 
STAT. 47:301, the court held when Columbia diverted some of the 
natural gas from the pipeline to power the compressors, such 
action constituted “transfer of title of possession of the gas for a 
consideration.”8 Even though no price in money was paid for the 
gas, LA. REV. STAT. 47:301 allows the price to be paid in money or 
otherwise. Therefore the fact that Columbia did not pay any money 
                                                                                                             
 5. LA. REV. STAT. 47:301 defines cost price: “‘Cost price’ means the 
actual cost of the articles of tangible personal property without any deductions 
therefrom on account of the cost of materials used, labor, or service cost, except 
those service costs for installing the articles of tangible personal property if such 
cost is separately billed to the customer at the time of installation, transportation 
charges, or any other expenses whatsoever, or the reasonable market value of the 
tangible personal property at the time it becomes susceptible to the use tax, 
whichever is less.” 
 6. Columbia, 28 So. 3d at 1034. 
 7. Id. at 1043. While Article 2439 states that Sale is a contract whereby a 
person transfers ownership of a thing to another for a price in money, LA. REV. 
STAT. 47:301(13)(a) defines “Sales price” as the total amount for which tangible 
personal property is sold, less the market value of any article traded in including 
any services, except services for financing, that are a part of the sale valued in 
money, whether paid in money or otherwise. (emphasis added) 
 8. Although the Civil Code articles do not use the term “consideration,” 
LA. REV. STAT. 47:301 uses the term for sales tax purposes. 
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for the gas did not preclude it being categorized as a sale for sales 
tax purposes. Finally, the court added that consideration could be 
inferred because “nothing in the record supports a finding that this 
transfer of gas was gratuitous,” and moreover, “businesses do not 
generally give away their assets.”9 The court of appeal then 
remanded to the trial court to determine the correct amount of sales 
tax owed by Columbia.10 
III. COMMENTARY 
This case illustrates the principle in Louisiana law that courts 
will give contracts their proper legal characterization, focusing on 
its component parts rather than form or wording. Thus, when the 
name or title fails to properly identify the nature of the contract, 
courts will apply the proper characterization according to the 
component parts of the contract.11 In this case, Columbia had an 
agreement with its customers that allowed it to use the gas free of 
charge to power the necessary compression stations, but despite the 
wording of the contract, the court of appeal categorized this as a 
taxable sale under LA. REV. STAT. 47:301.12 
Next, it is important to note that the court recognized that “laws 
regulating the collection of taxes are sui generis, and constitute a 
system to which the general provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code 
have little, if any, application.”13 Therefore the statute on sales tax 
should be considered separately from the Civil Code. Finally, this 
statute is lex specialis in that it deals specifically with sales tax, 
and should not impact the definition of a sale in the lex generalis.14 
One may not infer from this case that under Article 2439, a price 
                                                                                                             
 9. Id. at 1042. 
 10. Id. at 1044. 
 11. LA. CIV .CODE art. 2053. 
 12. Additionally, Judge Parro states, “the fact the terms of Columbia’s 
contracts with its customers were mandated by the FERC regulations does not 
render the sales tax law of this state inapplicable once the taxing jurisdiction of 
Louisiana was invoked.” 
 13. Columbia, 28 So. 3d at 1041. 
 14. The lex generalis in this case is LA. CIV .CODE art. 2439. 
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may be money or otherwise. If paid in kind, the contract is not a 
sale but an exchange.15 
Interestingly, the definition of sale in LA. REV. STAT. 47:301 is 
consistent with the common law definition of sale found in 
Uniform Commercial Code 2-304,16 in that both statutes allow that 
the price may be in money or otherwise. Likewise, in the law of 
lease, LA. CIV .CODE art. 2675 now allows the payment of rent to 
be in money or “otherwise,” specifically commodities, fruits, 
services or other performances specific to support an onerous 
contract. While this may suggest a pattern in the legislation,17 there 
does not appear to be any need to broaden the definition of a sale 
under Civil Code article 2439. The category of exchange already 
exists for these situations. Moreover, there is also a possibility of 
categorizing the contract as an innominate contract to categorize 
transactions where the price is not in money, but otherwise.18  
 
                                                                                                             
 15. ALAIN LEVASSEUR & DAVID GRUNNING, LOUISIANA LAW OF SALE AND 
LEASE 29 ( 2nd ed., 2011). 
 16. U.C.C. §2-304(1) states, “The price can be made payable in money or 
otherwise. If it is payable in whole or in part in goods each party is a seller of 
the goods which he is to transfer.” 
 17. In the international realm, the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) makes no reference to price being 
paid in money or otherwise. (emphasis added) 
 18. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2664 provides that, with several exceptions, the 
contract of exchange is governed by the rules of the contract of sale. Innominate 
Contracts are defined in art. 1914, in the general obligations portion of the Civil 
Code. 
